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Abstract
Background
Diagnostic clinical prediction rules (CPRs) are developed to improve diagnosis or decrease
diagnostic testing. Whether, and in what situations diagnostic CPRs improve upon clinical
judgment is unclear.
Methods and Findings
We searched MEDLINE, Embase and CINAHL, with supplementary citation and reference
checking for studies comparing CPRs and clinical judgment against a current objective ref-
erence standard. We report 1) the proportion of study participants classified as not having
disease who hence may avoid further testing and or treatment and 2) the proportion, among
those classified as not having disease, who do (missed diagnoses) by both approaches. 31
studies of 13 medical conditions were included, with 46 comparisons between CPRs and
clinical judgment. In 2 comparisons (4%), CPRs reduced the proportion of missed diagno-
ses, but this was offset by classifying a larger proportion of study participants as having dis-
ease (more false positives). In 36 comparisons (78%) the proportion of diagnoses missed
by CPRs and clinical judgment was similar, and in 9 of these, the CPRs classified a larger
proportion of participants as not having disease (fewer false positives). In 8 comparisons
(17%) the proportion of diagnoses missed by the CPRs was greater. This was offset by clas-
sifying a smaller proportion of participants as having the disease (fewer false positives) in 2
comparisons. There were no comparisons where the CPRmissed a smaller proportion of di-
agnoses than clinical judgment and classified more participants as not having the disease.
The design of the included studies allows evaluation of CPRs when their results are applied
independently of clinical judgment. The performance of CPRs, when implemented by clini-
cians as a support to their judgment may be different.
Conclusions
In the limited studies to date, CPRs are rarely superior to clinical judgment and there is gen-
erally a trade-off between the proportion classified as not having disease and the proportion
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of missed diagnoses. Differences between the two methods of judgment are likely the result
of different diagnostic thresholds for positivity. Which is the preferred judgment method for a
particular clinical condition depends on the relative benefits and harms of true positive and
false positive diagnoses.
Introduction
Diagnostic clinical prediction rules (CPRs) are tools designed to improve clinical decision mak-
ing [1]. Theoretically, CPRs, by providing objective estimates of the probability of the presence
or absence of disease derived from the statistical analysis of cases with known outcomes and or
by suggesting a clinical course of action, can improve the accuracy of diagnosis and or
decision making.
Understanding whether and in what situations CPRs improve upon clinical judgment is an
important step in the evaluation of CPRs and for the acceptance of CPRs by clinicians [2]. Ex-
isting research, which has focused on the comparative performance of CPRs and clinical judg-
ment when both judgment methods are viewed as competing alternatives, is difficult to
interpret. One body of research on the relative merits of clinical and statistical prediction has
consistently reported the superior accuracy of statistical models over a clinicians ability to inte-
grate the same data and to collect and integrate their preferred data [3–5], while another, more
recent body of research has found that heuristics – proposed as models of human judgment,
are on occasions more accurate than statistical models [6]. It is also difficult to know how to
apply the general findings of this research to clinical practice. Many of the reviews of compara-
tive accuracy have summarised findings from diverse professional fields including finance,
medicine, psychology and education. Further, judging the clinical utility of clinical judgment
and CPRs requires consideration of not just overall accuracy but the consequences of missed
diagnoses (false negative) and false positive results. Results of the existing comparative research
are generally not reported in a way that allows such evaluation.
We conducted a systematic review of studies that compared the performance of diagnostic
CPRs with clinical judgment or the performance of the combination of CPR and clinical judg-
ment versus either alone in the same study participants against a current and objective
reference standard.
Methods
This review was performed following methods detailed in the systematic review protocol (S1
Table– Study protocol) and is reported in line with the PRISMA Statement (S2 Table –
PRISMA checklist).
Data sources and searches
We searched MEDLINE, Embase and CINAHL from inception to January 2012, with an up-
dated MEDLINE search to March 2013 (S3 Table – Electronic database search strategies). No
limits were applied to the database searches. We also searched for systematic reviews of diag-
nostic CPRs using PubMed Clinical Queries. The reference lists of systematic reviews and the
included studies were checked. We conducted forward searches of included studies using Sci-
ence Citation Index Expanded in Web of Science and checked related citations using PubMed's
Related Citations link.
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Study selection
We included studies that compared the CPRs with clinical judgment in the same participants
using a current and objective reference standard. We also included studies that compared a
CPR or clinical judgment alone with the combination of CPR and clinical judgment and
modelling studies to determine the added value of CPRs above clinical judgment. The CPR had
to have been developed using a method of statistical analysis and tested against clinical judg-
ment in a population different (by time, location or domain) to that from which it was derived.
Studies where the CPR and clinical judgment were applied to different individuals (for exam-
ple, in randomised trials) or were not applied at approximately the same point in the diagnostic
pathway were excluded (for example, if the result of a CPR was determined using data collected
at first presentation and this was compared to clinical judgment made after further consulta-
tion, testing and observation). We excluded studies of CPRs for the diagnosis of disorders
across multiple body systems, that were not applied to actual patients, that are used for the in-
terpretation of tests such as ECGs or that are performed in selected samples of patients not
consistent with populations for whom use of the CPR is not intended.
Titles and abstracts identified by the searches were screened by one reviewer and obviously
irrelevant articles excluded. A second reviewer independently screened 15% of the titles and ab-
stracts to ensure that no further studies met the inclusion criteria. After screening, potentially
relevant studies were obtained in full text and independently assessed by two reviewers against
the review inclusion criteria. Discrepancies were discussed and resolved with a third reviewer.
Data extraction and risk of bias assessment
Two reviewers (SS and JD) independently extracted data on the characteristics of the study, the
risk of bias and the results using a piloted data collection form. QUADAS-2 [7] was used to as-
sess the risk of bias and concerns regarding applicability in each of the included studies. We
added an additional signalling question to identify if clinical judgment and the CPR were deter-
mined independently. Discrepancies between reviewers were discussed and resolved by discus-
sion with a third reviewer.
Data synthesis and analysis
We grouped studies where a probability estimate, clinical diagnosis or decision was made by;
a. Clinical judgment alone;
b. Clinical judgment with a method of structured data collection. Clinicians may have collect-
ed data on variables contained in the CPR as per the study protocol but calculation of the re-
sults of a CPR by the clinician was not anticipated or expected, or occurred after the
clinician had provided their probability estimate or diagnosis; or
c. A combination of clinical judgment and clinical prediction rule, where the clinician had ac-
cess to the results of the CPR but could also use their own judgment or override the CPR.
We also recorded whether the result of the CPR was calculated by the examining doctor or a
researcher, the method used to elicit clinical judgment and whether clinical judgment was a cli-
nicians probability or risk assessment (e.g. low or high risk), a diagnosis or a clinical decision.
Because many clinical prediction rules are developed to either improve the proportion of in-
dividuals with a suspected disease classified as not having the disease (thereby decreasing the
number of participants undergoing further testing, referral or treatment), or to reduce the
number of cases of disease missed by the current diagnostic protocol, the main outcome mea-
sures of the review were 1) the percent of study participants classified as not having the disease
Diagnostic Clinical Prediction Rules versus Clinical Judgment
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by the CPR or clinical judgment ((False negative (FN)+ True negative (TN))/total number of
participants in the study (total N). The higher this proportion, the fewer individuals that may
undergo further testing, referral and or treatment, and 2) the percent of study participants
among those classified by the CPR or clinical judgment as not having the disease who actually
have the disease (FN/(FN+TN) or 1-negative predictive value). It is desirable that this be as
close to 0% as possible. We also report measures of diagnostic accuracy including the sensitivity
(True positive (TP)/(TP+ FN)) and 4) specificity (True negative (TN)/(FP+TN)) of CPRs and
clinical judgment, and present graphically the proportion of all study participants who are clas-
sified by CPRs and clinical judgment as having disease who do (True Positives/total N) and do
not (False Positives/total N) and the proportion of all participants who are classified as not hav-
ing disease who do (False Negatives/total N) and do not (True Negatives/total N).
We did not perform a meta-analysis due to clinical and statistical heterogeneity. Instead, we
synthesised the results of the included studies overall, and by clinical condition (where there
were 2 or more studies available) by determining the number of comparisons in which the pro-
portion of participants classified as not having disease and the proportion of missed cases of
disease (missed diagnoses) in participants classified as not having disease for CPRs and clinical
judgement was similar, greater or lesser. To determine whether there was a difference in the
proportion classified as not having disease between CPRs and clinical judgment we conducted
a statistical test of the difference between two proportions from dependent samples. To obtain
the statistical significance of the relative difference in the proportion classified by CPRs and
clinical judgment as not having disease that do, we conducted a test of the strength of associa-
tion between two proportions (false negative rates) from dependent samples. If studies re-
ported different thresholds for clinical judgment or the CPR, and if the proportions (i.e. those
classified as not having disease and the proportion of missed diagnoses) were similar at the dif-
ferent thresholds (this only occurred in 1 study included in this review) we reported only the
comparison for the threshold with the highest Youden’s index ((sensitivity + specificity)-1).
Results
Literature search
Of 10,155 titles and abstracts screened against review eligibility criteria, 330 were obtained in
full text and assessed for eligibility by two reviewers. 31 studies [8–38] were included in the re-
view (Fig 1 – PRISMA flow diagram of article selection process).
Study characteristics
The studies addressed a variety of conditions: 9 for pulmonary embolism (PE) [8–16], 6 for
deep vein thrombosis (DVT) [17–22], 3 for streptococcal throat infection [23–25], 3 for ankle
and/or foot fracture [26–28], 2 for acute appendicitis [29, 30] and one each for acute coronary
syndrome [31], pneumonia [32], head injury in children [33], cervical spine injury [34], active
pulmonary tuberculosis [35], malaria [36], bacteraemia [37] and influenza [38] (Table 1 – Clin-
ical conditions and study comparisons). Twenty five different CPRs were evaluated. The ma-
jority (n = 16) were derived from logistic regression analysis and the remainder from recursive
partitioning analysis (n = 3), discriminant analysis (n = 2), neural networking (n = 1), simple
Bayesian analysis (n = 2) and an unspecified multivariable analysis (n = 1). In just over half of
the included studies (n = 17), clinical judgment was a clinicians estimate of the probability of
the presence of disease or categorisation of a study participant into a risk group (e.g. low, inter-
mediate or high risk). In the remaining studies, clinical judgment was a clinicians diagnosis
(n = 8), intended management (n = 3) or the clinical action taken (n = 3). In half of the includ-
ed studies (n = 15) the experience of clinicians estimating the probability of the target disorder
Diagnostic Clinical Prediction Rules versus Clinical Judgment
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or making a diagnosis or management decision was not reported. Ten studies included clini-
cians with varying levels of experience (e.g. ‘post graduates’ and ‘confirmed emergency physi-
cians’), 3 included specialists only and 3 junior staff only.
Risk of bias
87% (27/31) of studies were judged to be at high or unclear risk of bias on two or more domains
of the QUADAS-2 tool (Fig 2 – Summary QUADAS-2 risk of bias and applicability judg-
ments). The most common risk of bias was due to interpretation of the reference standard oc-
curring with knowledge of the index test result. For most studies in which the CPR was applied
retrospectively to the data, it was not possible to determine whether researchers were blind to
the result of the reference standard test. This is likely to bias results in favour of the CPR. 55%
(17/31) of studies were judged to be at high risk of bias on the flow and timing domain. Studies
commonly failed to include all enrolled cases in the data analysis or incorporated one of the
Fig 1. PRISMA flow diagram of article selection process.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0128233.g001
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index tests in the reference standard. Risks of bias assessments for individual studies are shown
in Table 2 – Risk of bias and applicability concerns for individual studies included in
the review.
Study results
Results of the included studies are Tabulated in Table 3 – Characteristics and results of includ-
ed studies, Table 4 – Characteristics and results of included studies for conditions with 2
studies, and presented graphically in Fig 3 – Accuracy estimates of clinical judgment versus
CPRs for the included studies and Fig 4 – Accuracy estimates of clinical judgment versus CPRs
for the included studies for conditions with2 studies.
There were 41 comparisons between CPRs and clinical judgment [8–12, 14–16, 18–28, 30–
33, 35–38] (Table 3, Table 4, Fig 3 and Fig 4). In 2 (5%) comparisons (10, 37), CPRs reduced
the proportion of missed diagnoses in those classified as not having the disease, but this was
offset by classifying a larger proportion of study participants as having disease (more false posi-
tives). In 33 (80%) comparisons [8, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18, 19, 21, 23– 28, 30– 33, 35, 36, 38] the
proportion of diagnoses missed by the CPR and clinical judgment was similar and in 7 of these
comparisons [15, 18, 19, 27, 32, 36] CPRs classified a larger proportion of participants as not
having disease (fewer false positives) and a similar proportion in 16 [8, 9, 11, 12, 21, 23–26, 30,
32, 35, 36, 38]. In 6 (15%) comparisons [8, 16, 20, 22, 25] the proportion of diagnoses missed
by the CPR was greater. This was offset by classifying a smaller proportion of participants as
having the disease (fewer false positives) in 2 [8, 25] comparisons. In 3 of the 6 comparisons
[16, 20, 22] the CPRs classified a similar proportion of participants as having the disease. There
Table 1. Clinical conditions and study comparisons.
Clinical condition Number of studies (number
of comparisons)
Methods of estimating a probability, making a diagnosis or
management decision being compared (number of comparisons)
Pulmonary embolism [8–16] 9* (16) CPR versus clinical judgment alone (1)
CPR versus clinical judgment + structured data collection (13)
CPR versus combination of clinical judgment and CPR (2)
Deep vein thrombosis [17–22] 6 (7) CPR versus clinical judgment alone (1)
CPR versus clinical judgment + structured data collection (5)
CPR versus combination of clinical judgment and CPR (1)
Streptococcal throat infection [23–25] 3 (5) CPR versus clinical judgment + structured data collection (5)
Ankle or foot fracture [26–28] 3 (4) CPR versus clinical judgment alone (1)
CPR versus clinical judgment + structured data collection (3)
Acute appendicitis [29–30] 2 (2) CPR versus clinical judgment alone (1)
CPR versus combination of clinical judgment and CPR (1)
Acute coronary syndrome [31] 1 (1) CPR versus clinical judgment + structured data collection (1)
Pneumonia [32] 1 (4) CPR versus clinical judgment + structured data collection (4)
Abnormalities on computed tomography
scan in child with head injury [33]
1 (1) CPR versus clinical judgment alone (1)
Cervical spine injuries [34] 1 (1) CPR versus combination of clinical judgment and CPR (1)
Active pulmonary tuberculosis [35] 1 (1) CPR versus clinical judgment + structured data collection (1)
Malaria [36] 1 (2) CPR versus clinical judgment alone (2)
Bacteremia [37] 1 (1) CPR versus clinical judgment + structured data collection (1)
Inﬂuenza [38] 1 (1) CPR versus clinical judgment alone (1)
* 8 cohorts
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0128233.t001
Diagnostic Clinical Prediction Rules versus Clinical Judgment
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0128233 June 3, 2015 6 / 25
was 1 comparison [16] where the CPR both missed more diagnoses and classified a larger pro-
portion of participants as having the disease (more false positives), but no comparisons where
the CPR missed fewer diagnoses and classified a larger proportion of participants as not
having disease.
There were 5 comparisons between CPRs and the combination of CPR and clinical judg-
ment [13, 17, 29, 34] (Table 3, Table 4, Fig 3 and Fig 4). In 3 (60%) comparisons the proportion
of diagnoses missed was similar [13, 17, 34] and in 2 [17, 34] of these comparisons, CPRs clas-
sified a larger proportion of study participants as not having disease (fewer false positives) than
the combination of CPR and clinical judgment. In 2 (40%) comparisons [13, 29], the propor-
tion of diagnoses missed by the CPRs was greater while the proportion classified as not having
disease by the CPRs and the combination of CPR and clinical judgment was similar. There
were no comparisons between the combination of CPR and clinical judgment and clinical
judgment alone.
There were 5 studies [11, 12, 17, 25, 36] of 10 comparisons, that used different thresholds
for the CPR or clinical judgment (for example, Kabrhel et al, 2005 [11] compared clinical judg-
ment to the Wells PE score at threshold<2 and4). We report on the results of 9 of these
comparisons, excluding the results of 1 comparison [17] where the proportions of interest (that
is, the proportion classified as having disease or the proportion of missed diagnoses) were simi-
lar at the different thresholds. This means that for a small number of comparisons (n = 4) clini-
cal judgment is counted twice [11, 12, 25, 36].
Fig 2. Summary QUADAS-2 [7] risk of bias and applicability judgments.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0128233.g002
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Table 2. Risk of bias and applicability concerns for individual studies included in the review.
Study Risk of Bias Concerns regarding Applicability
Patient
selection
Index
test
(CPR)*
Index test
(clinical
judgment)
Reference
standard†
Flow and
timing ‡
Patient
selection
Index
test
(CPR)
Index test
(clinical
judgment)
Reference
standard
Pulmonary embolism
Runyon et al,
2005 [8]
Unclear Unclear Low Low High Low Low Low Low
Kabrhel et al,
2009 [9]
Low Unclear Low Unclear High Unclear Low Low Low
Kline et al, 2008
[10]
Low Unclear Low Unclear Unclear Unclear Low Low Low
Kabrhel et al,
2005[11]
Unclear Unclear Low Unclear High Unclear Low Low Low
Carrier et al, 2006
[12]
Low Unclear Low Unclear High Low Low Low Low
Chagnon et al,
2002 [13]
Low Unclear Low Unclear High Unclear Low Low Low
Penaloza et al,
2012 [14]
Low Unclear Low Unclear High Low Low Low Low
Sanson et al,
2000 [15]
Low Unclear Low Unclear High Low Low Low Low
Penaloza et al,
2013 [16]
Low Unclear Low Unclear High Low Low Low Low
Deep vein thrombosis
Geersing et al,
2010 [17]
Low Low Low Unclear High Low Low Low Low
Bigaroni
et al,2000[18]
Low Low Low Unclear Unclear Low Low Low Low
Miron et al, 2000
[19]
Low Low Low High High Low Low Low Low
Blattler et al, 2004
[20]
Low High Low Unclear Low Low Low Low Low
Cornuz et al, 2002
[21]
Low Low Low Low High Low Low Low Low
Wang et al, 2013
[22]
Unclear Unclear Low Unclear Unclear Low Low Low Low
Streptococcal throat infection
Cebul and Poses,
1986 [23]
Unclear Unclear Low Low High Low Low Low Low
Rosenberg et al,
2002 [24]
High Unclear Low Low High Low Low Low Low
Attia et al, 2001
[25]
Unclear Unclear Low Low High Unclear Low Low Low
Ankle or foot fracture
Glas et al, 2002
[26]
Low Unclear Low Low Low Low Low Low Low
Singh-Ranger and
Marathias, 1999
[27]
Low Low Low Unclear Low Low Low Low Low
Al Omar and
Baldwin, 2002 [28]
Unclear Low Low Unclear Low Low Low Low Low
Conditions with  2 studies
Fenyo, 1987 [29] Low Low Low Unclear High Low Low Low Low
(Continued)
Diagnostic Clinical Prediction Rules versus Clinical Judgment
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Pulmonary embolism
From 9 studies in pulmonary embolism, there were 9 comparisons between the Wells PE score
(original 3 level or 2 level score) and clinical judgment [8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16]. In 8 (89%) com-
parisons [8, 9, 11–13, 15], the proportion of diagnoses missed by the score and clinical judg-
ment was similar. In 1 of these [15], the score classified a larger proportion of all participants as
not having the disease (fewer false positives), a similar proportion in 5 comparisons [8, 9, 11,
12, 13] and a larger proportion of participants as having the disease (more false positives) in 2
[11, 12]. In 1 (11%) comparison [16], the proportion of diagnoses missed by the Wells PE score
was greater, while the proportion of participants classified as not having the disease was simi-
lar. In 2 comparisons between the PERC Rule and clinical judgment [10, 14], the rule reduced
the proportion of missed diagnosis in 1 [10], but this was offset by classifying a larger propor-
tion of participants as having the disease (more false positives). In the other comparison [14],
the proportion of diagnoses missed by the PERC rule and clinical judgment was similar. In 1
Table 2. (Continued)
Study Risk of Bias Concerns regarding Applicability
Patient
selection
Index
test
(CPR)*
Index test
(clinical
judgment)
Reference
standard†
Flow and
timing ‡
Patient
selection
Index
test
(CPR)
Index test
(clinical
judgment)
Reference
standard
Meltzer et al, 2013
[30]
Unclear Unclear Low Unclear High Low Low Low Low
Mitchell et al,
2006 [31]
Low Unclear Low Unclear Unclear Low Low Low Low
Emerman et al,
1991 [32]
Unclear Unclear Low Low Low Low Low Low Low
Crowe et al, 2010
[33]
High Unclear Low Unclear Unclear Low Unclear Low Low
Vaillancourt et al,
2009 [34]
High Unclear Low Low High Low Low Low Low
El-Solh et al, 1999
[35]
Low Unclear Low Low Low Low Low Low Unclear
Bojang et al, 2000
[36]
Unclear Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Low
Leibovici et al,
1991 [37]
Low Unclear Unclear Low Low Low Low Low Low
Stein et al, 2005
[38]
Unclear Unclear Low Low Unclear Low Low Low Low
* In studies where the CPR is applied retrospectively to the data by the researcher using predictor data collected by the clinician, if there was no
statement that researchers were blind to the reference standard the risk of bias was considered to be unclear. If predictor data was collected by the
researcher and there was no statement that researchers were blind to the reference standard, the risk of bias was considered to be high.
†When the reference standard comprised subjective tests, if there was no statement that those interpreting the reference standard tests were blind to the
results of either the CPR or clinician, the risk of bias was considered to be unclear.
‡If the method of determining disease status involved a combination of different tests in which some tests were applied to some patients and one test
applied to all patients (differential veriﬁcation) then the risk of bias was considered to be unclear. If performance of any of the reference standard tests was
dependent upon the results of the index test, the risk of bias was considered to be high. If it was not possible to determine whether all eligible patients had
been included in the analysis the risk of bias was considered to be unclear. If it was clear that not all patients had been included in the analysis (due to
missing outcome data or because data from the clinicians estimate or data necessary to derive the results of the CPR were not available) and these
studies reported results for the comparisons in different numbers of cases or only presented the results for cases on which data for both the comparisons
was available, the risk of bias was considered to be high. Risk of bias was recorded as high if either of the issues relating to the reference standard test or
analysis were high.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0128233.t002
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Table 3. Characteristics and results of included studies.
Study Setting Method of
establishing
status of target
disorder
Prevalence
(n/N)
Comparison
(method of
estimating the
probability of
target
disorder,
making a
diagnosis or
management
decision)
Threshold
(low risk
if)
Sensitivity
(95% CI)
Speciﬁcity
(95% CI)
% missed
cases of
disease
among
those
classiﬁed
as not
having
disease
(95% CI)*
%
classiﬁed
as not
having
disease
(95% CI)+
Pulmonary
embolism
Runyon et al,
2005 [8]
ED Medical record
review, F/U by mail
or telephone and
death records at 1.5
months
6% (144/
2477)
Clinical
judgment
+ structured
data collection
<15% 69 (61–76) 72 (70–74) 2.6 (1.9–
3.5)
69 (67–71)
Wells PE
score
calculated by
researcher
<2 62 (54–70) 75 (73–77) 3.0 (2.3–
3.9)
73 (70–74)
Charlotte
score
calculated by
clinician
Safe 36 (28–45) 89 (88–91) 4.2 (3.5–
5.2)
88 (87–89)
Kabrhel et al,
2009 [9]
ED Adjudicated review
of imaging results,
medical records
and F/U at 1.5
months
7% (545/
7940)
Clinical
judgment
alone
<15% 69 (65–73) 70 (69–71) 3.1 (2.7–
3.6)
68 (67–69)
Wells PE
score
calculated by
researcher
<2 68 (64–72) 72 (71–73) 3.2 (2.7–
3.7)
69 (68–70)
Kline et al,
2008 [10]
ED Adjudicated review
of imaging results,
medical records
and F/U at 1.5
months
7% (561/
8138)
Clinical
judgment
+ structured
data collection
<15% 71 (67–74) 69 (68–71) 3.0 (2.6–
3.5)
67 (66–68)
PERC Rule
calculated by
researcher
No criteria
present
96 (94–97) 25 (24–26) 1.3 (0.9–
1.9)
24 (23–25)
Kabrhel et al,
2005 [11]
ED Review of medical
records at 3 months
F/U
10% (61/
607)
Clinical
judgment
+ structured
data collection
Alternate
diagnosis
not less
likely
54 (41–67) 76 (73–80) 6.3 (4.4–
8.9)
73 (70–77)
Wells PE
score
calculated by
researcher
<2 79 (66–88) 57 (53–61) 4.0 (2.4–
6.7)
54 (50–58)
4 59 (46–72) 78 (74–81) 5.5 (3.8–
8.1)
74 (70–77)
Carrier et al,
2006 [12]
NMD Patient follow-up by
telephone or return
appointment at 3
months
18% (76/
413)
Clinical
judgment
+ structured
data collection
<20% 86 (76–93) 38 (33–43) 7.5 (4.3–
13.0)
34 (30–38)
(Continued)
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Table 3. (Continued)
Study Setting Method of
establishing
status of target
disorder
Prevalence
(n/N)
Comparison
(method of
estimating the
probability of
target
disorder,
making a
diagnosis or
management
decision)
Threshold
(low risk
if)
Sensitivity
(95% CI)
Speciﬁcity
(95% CI)
% missed
cases of
disease
among
those
classiﬁed
as not
having
disease
(95% CI)*
%
classiﬁed
as not
having
disease
(95% CI)+
Wells PE
score
calculated by
researcher
2 95 (87–99) 19 (15–24) 5.8 (2.3–
14.0)
17 (13–21)
4 83 (73–91) 41 (35–46) 8.7 (5.1–
14.3)
36 (32–41)
Rodgers
model
calculated by
researcher
No criteria
present
96 (89–99) 9 (6–13) 3.2 (1.1–
8.9)
24 (20–28)
Chagnon et al,
2002 [13]
ED Follow-up (method
not speciﬁed) at 3
months
26% (71/
277)
Clinical
judgment +
access to the
Geneva Score
‘low’ 89 (79–95) 67 (60–73) 5.5 (2.8–
10.4)
53 (47–59)
Wells PE
score
calculated by
researcher
<2 73 (61–83) 69 (63–76) 11.7 (7.6–
17.6)
59 (53–64)
Geneva Score
calculated by
clinician
4 72 (60–82) 64 (57–71) 13.2 (8.7–
19.5)
55 (49–61)
Penaloza et al,
2012 [14]
ED Review of imaging
results, medical
records and patient
or relative follow-up
at 3 months
30% (286/
959)
Clinical
judgment
+ structured
data collection
‘low’ 91 (87–94) 55 (52–59) 6.5 (4.5–
9.4)
42 (39–45)
Revised
Geneva Score
+ PERC Rule
calculated by
researcher
<4 and no
criteria
present
99 (97–
99.6)
9 (7–12) 6.2 (2.4–
14.8)
7 (5–9)
PERC Rule
calculated by
researcher
No criteria
present
99 (97–
99.6)
10 (8–13) 5.4 (2.1–
13.1)
8 (6–10)
Sanson et al,
2000 [15]
IP, OPD Perfusion lung
scintigraphy or
pulmonary
angiography
31% (160/
517)
Clinical
judgment
+ structured
data collection
<20% 91 (85–96) 16 (12–21) 19.0 (10.9–
30.9)
14 (11–18)
Wells PE
score
calculated by
researcher
<2 66 (57–75) 36 (31–42) 27.9 (21.3–
35.6)
36 (31–40)
Penaloza et al,
2013 [16]
ED Review of imaging
results, medical
records and patient
or relative follow-up
at 3 months
31% (325/
1038)
Clinical
judgment
+ structured
data collection
‘low’ 90 (86–93) 58 (54–61) 7.6 (5.5–
10.5)
43 (40–46)
(Continued)
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Table 3. (Continued)
Study Setting Method of
establishing
status of target
disorder
Prevalence
(n/N)
Comparison
(method of
estimating the
probability of
target
disorder,
making a
diagnosis or
management
decision)
Threshold
(low risk
if)
Sensitivity
(95% CI)
Speciﬁcity
(95% CI)
% missed
cases of
disease
among
those
classiﬁed
as not
having
disease
(95% CI)*
%
classiﬁed
as not
having
disease
(95% CI)+
Wells PE
score
calculated by
researcher
<2 82 (77–85) 60 (56–63) 12.6 (9.9–
15.8)
47 (44–50)
Revised
Geneva Score
calculated by
researcher
<4 89 (85–92) 33 (30–37) 13.0 (9.5–
17.5)
26 (23–29)
Deep vein
thrombosis
Study Setting Method of
establishing
status of target
disorder
Prevalence
(n/N)
Comparison
(method of
estimating the
probability of
target
disorder,
making
diagnosis or
management
decision)
Threshold
(low risk
if)
Sensitivity
(95% CI)
Speciﬁcity
(95% CI)
% missed
cases of
disease
among
those
classiﬁed
as not
having
disease
(95% CI)
%
classiﬁed
as not
having
disease
(95% CI)
Geersing et al,
2010 [17]
PC Clinical probability,
ultrasound and F/U
at 3 months
14% 136/
1002
Clinical
judgment +
access to the
Oudega Rule
<10% 98 (94–99) 24 (22–27) 1.4 (0.5–
4.0)
21 (19–24)
Oudega Rule
calculated by
clinician
< = 3 95 (90–98) 57 (54–60) 1.4 (0.6–
2.9)
50 (47–53)
Bigaroni et al,
2000 [18]
ED,
OPD
D-dimer,
ultrasound, other
imaging and
telephone F/U at 3
months
17% (28/
165)
Clinical
judgment
+structured
data collection
‘Low risk’ 98 (85–
99.8)
46 (38–54) 0.0 (0.0–
5.8)
38 (31–46)
Wells DVT
Score
calculated by
junior clinician
<1 71 (53–85) 75 (67–82) 7.2 (3.7–
13.6)
67 (60–74)
Wells DVT
score
calculated by
senior clinician
<1 79 (61–90) 74 (66–80) 5.6 (2.6–
11.7)
65 (57–72)
Miron et al,
2000 [19]
ED,
OPD
D-dimer,
ultrasound, other
imaging and
telephone F/U at 3
months
21%(57/
270)
Clinical
judgment
+ structured
data collection
<20% 98 (91–
99.7)
36 (30–43) 1.3 (0.2–
6.9)
29 (24–35)
Wells DVT
score
calculated by
researcher
<1 93 (83–97) 57 (50–63) 3.2 (1.3–
7.9)
46 (40–52)
(Continued)
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Table 3. (Continued)
Study Setting Method of
establishing
status of target
disorder
Prevalence
(n/N)
Comparison
(method of
estimating the
probability of
target
disorder,
making a
diagnosis or
management
decision)
Threshold
(low risk
if)
Sensitivity
(95% CI)
Speciﬁcity
(95% CI)
% missed
cases of
disease
among
those
classiﬁed
as not
having
disease
(95% CI)*
%
classiﬁed
as not
having
disease
(95% CI)+
Blattler et al,
2004 [20]
OPD Ultrasound and
telephone F/U at 6
+ months
28%(57/
206)
Clinical
judgment
+ structured
data collection
(includes D-
dimer)
‘Low risk’ 81(69–89) 85 (79–90) 8.0 (4.5–
13.7)
67 (60–73)
Wells DVT
score
calculated by
researcher
Low 54 (42–67) 84 (77–89) 17.2 (12.0–
24.0)
73 (67–79)
Cornuz et al,
2002 [21]
VL Ultrasound, other
imaging, mail or
telephone F/U
29% (82/
278)
Clinical
judgment
+ structured
data collection
<20% 87 (78–92) 38 (32–45) 12.8 (7.3–
21.5)
31 (26–37)
Wells DVT
score
calculated by
researcher
<1 83 (73–90) 49 (42–56) 12.8 (7.8–
20.4)
39 (34–45)
Wang et al,
2013 [22]
OPD Ultrasound and
telephone or email
F/U at 1.5 months
47% (191/
405)
Clinical
judgment
alone
‘Safe’ 76 (70–82) 89 (84–92) 19.2 (14.6–
24.7)
58 (53–63)
Wells DVT
score**
calculated by
clinician
< = 1 62 (55–69) 72 (66–78) 31.9 (26.1–
38.2)
56 (51–61)
Study Setting Method of
establishing
status of target
disorder
Prevalence
(n/N)
Comparison
(method of
estimating the
probability of
target
disorder,
making
diagnosis or
management
decision)
Threshold
(low risk
if)
Sensitivity
(95% CI)
Speciﬁcity
(95% CI)
% missed
cases of
disease
among
those
classiﬁed
as not
having
disease
(95% CI)
%
classiﬁed
as not
having
disease
(95% CI)
Streptococcal
throat
infection
Cebul and
Poses, 1986
[23]
PC/
Adults
Throat culture 5% (15/310) Clinical
judgment
+ structured
data collection
No
treatment
53 (27–79) 68 (62–73) 3.4 (1.7–
6.9)
67 (61–72)
Walsh model
+Tomkins
management
rule calculated
by researcher
No
treatment
80 (52–95) 67 (61–72) 1.5 (0.5–
4.3)
65 (59–70)
(Continued)
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Table 3. (Continued)
Study Setting Method of
establishing
status of target
disorder
Prevalence
(n/N)
Comparison
(method of
estimating the
probability of
target
disorder,
making a
diagnosis or
management
decision)
Threshold
(low risk
if)
Sensitivity
(95% CI)
Speciﬁcity
(95% CI)
% missed
cases of
disease
among
those
classiﬁed
as not
having
disease
(95% CI)*
%
classiﬁed
as not
having
disease
(95% CI)+
Centor model
+ Tomkins
management
rule calculated
by researcher
No
treatment
100 (75–
100)
66 (60–72) 0.0 (0.0–
2.2)
63 (57–69)
Rosenberg
et al, 2002 [24]
ED/
Mixed
Pharyngeal swab
culture
25% (32/
126)
Clinical
judgment
+ structured
data collection
+ rapid test
No
treatment
90 (74–98) 92 (87–95) 5.0 (2.0–
12.2)
64 (55–71)
Modiﬁed
Centor Score
calculated by
researcher
No
treatment
97 (84–
99.5)
78 (68–86) 1.4 (0.2–
7.3)
59 (50–67)
Attia et al, 2001
[25]
ED,
OPD/
Children
Tonsillopharyngeal
swab culture
37% (218/
587)
Clinical
judgment
+ structured
data collection
< = 50% 72 (66–78) 60 (55–65) 21.6 (17.2–
26.7)
48 (44–52)
Clinical
prediction
rule of Attia
calculated by
researcher
0 99 (97–
99.9)
5 (3–7) 11.8 (3.3–
34.3)
3 (2–5)
< = 3 18 (13–24) 97 (95–99) 34.7 (30.7–
39.0)
91 (89–94)
Ankle and or
foot fracture
Study Setting Method of
establishing
status of target
disorder
Prevalence
(n/N)
Comparison
(method of
estimating the
probability of
target
disorder,
making
diagnosis or
management
decision)
Threshold
(low risk
if)
Sensitivity
(95% CI)
Speciﬁcity
(95% CI)
% missed
cases of
disease
among
those
classiﬁed
as not
having
disease
(95% CI)
%
classiﬁed
as not
having
disease
(95% CI)
Glas et al,
2002 [26]
ED/
Adults
Ankle and midfoot
x-ray
6% (41/
647)§
Clinical
judgment
+ structured
data collection
No X-ray 98 (87–
99.6)
66 (62–70) 0.3 (0.0–
1.4)
62 (59–66)
OAR – ankle
and foot
calculated by
researcher
Negative 98 (87–
99.6)
26 (22–29) 0.6 (0.1–
3.5)
24 (21–28)
Leiden ankle
rule calculated
by researcher
< = 7 88 (74–96) 57 (53–61) 1.4 (0.6–
3.3)
55 (51–58)
(Continued)
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comparison [16] the Revised Geneva Score both missed more diagnoses and classified a larger
proportion of participants as having the disease than clinical judgment. In 1 comparison [13]
between the Geneva score and the combination of clinical judgment and score, the proportion
of diagnoses missed by the CPR was greater.
Deep vein thrombosis
From 6 studies of DVT, there were 6 comparisons between the Wells DVT score and clinical
judgment [18–22]. There were no comparisons in which the score reduced the proportion of
missed diagnoses. In 4 (67%) comparisons the proportion of diagnoses missed by the score and
clinical judgment was similar [18, 19, 21]. In 3 of these [18, 19] the score classified a larger pro-
portion of all participants as not having disease (fewer false positives) and in 1 [21] the propor-
tion was similar. In 2 comparisons [20, 22] the proportion of diagnoses missed by the CPR was
greater, with a similar proportion classified as not having the disease. In 1 comparison [17] be-
tween the Oudega Rule and the combination of clinical judgment and Oudega Rule, the pro-
portion of diagnoses missed was similar, with the rule classifying a larger proportion of
participants as not having the disease (fewer false positives).
Table 3. (Continued)
Study Setting Method of
establishing
status of target
disorder
Prevalence
(n/N)
Comparison
(method of
estimating the
probability of
target
disorder,
making a
diagnosis or
management
decision)
Threshold
(low risk
if)
Sensitivity
(95% CI)
Speciﬁcity
(95% CI)
% missed
cases of
disease
among
those
classiﬁed
as not
having
disease
(95% CI)*
%
classiﬁed
as not
having
disease
(95% CI)+
Singh-Ranger
and Marathias
1999 [27]
ED/
Adults
Ankle x-ray 17% (3/18)II Clinical
judgment
alone
No fracture 100 (31–
100)
0.0 (0.0–
22)
0.0 (0.0–
0.0)
0 (0–18)
OAR – ankle
calculated by
researcher
Negative 100 (31–
100)
67 (38–85) 0.0 (0.0–
27.8)
56 (34–75)
Al Omar and
Baldwin 2002
[28]
ED/
Children
Ankle or midfoot x-
ray
21% (17/80)
§¶
Clinical
judgment
+ structured
data collection
No fracture 65 (38–86) 76 (64–86) 11.1 (5.2–
22.2)
68 (57–77)
OAR – ankle
and foot
calculated by
researcher
Negative 100 (80–
100)
30 (19–43) 0.0 (0.0–
16.8)
24 (16–34)
*% missed cases of disease among those classiﬁed as not having disease (FN/FN+TN or 1-negative predictive value)
†% classiﬁed as not having disease (FN+TN/total study N)
§ankle or midfoot fracture
II ankle fracture Includes Salter Harris fractures
**2-category Wells DVT score
ED – emergency department OPD – Outpatient department VL – vascular laboratory PC – primary care NMD – nuclear medicine department F/U – follow-
up OAR – Ottawa ankle rules PE – pulmonary embolism DVT- deep vein thrombosis
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0128233.t003
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Table 4. Characteristics and results of included studies for conditions with2 studies.
Study Setting Method of
establishing
disease status
Prevalence
(n/N)
Comparison
(method of
estimating
probability,
making
diagnosis or
management
decision)
Threshold
(low risk if)
Sensitivity
(95%CI)
Speciﬁcity
(95% CI)
% missed
cases of
disease
among
those
classiﬁed
as not
having
disease
(95% CI)
%
classiﬁed
as not
having
disease
(95% CI)
Fenyo, 1987
[29]
IP Intraop diagnosis,
histopathology of
excised
appendices and
record review at
1–2 years
31% (256/
830)
Clinical
judgment
+ access to
results of Fenyo
Score
No surgery 100 (99–
100)
91 (88–93) 0.0 (0.0–0.7) 63 (59–66)
Fenyo Score
calculated by
researcher
11 90 (86–94) 92 (89–94) 4.6 (3.1–6.6) 66 (63–69)
Meltzer
et al, 2013
[30]
ED Surgical
pathology, CT
scan or telephone
F/U at 7 days
20% (53/
261)
Clinical
judgment alone
Appendicitis
not most
likely
diagnosis
79 (66–89) 68 (61–74) 7.2 (4.1–
12.5)
58 (52–64)
Modiﬁed
Alvarado score
calculated by
researcher
<4 72 (58–83) 54 (47–61) 11.8 (7.3–
18.6)
49 (43–55)
Mitchell
et al, 2006
[(31]
ED Review of
medical records
and telephone F/
U at 1.5 months
5% (51/
1114)
Clinical
judgment
+ structured
data collection
2% 96 (87–99) 27 (25–30) 0.7 (0.2–2.5) 26 (24–29)
ACI-TIPI
calculated by
researcher
2% 100 (93–
100)
5 (4–7) 0.0 (0.0–6.4) 5 (4–7)
Emerman
et al, 1991
[32]
ED,
OPC
Posteroanterior
and lateral chest
x-ray
7% (21/290) Clinical
judgment
+ structured
data collection
No
radiograph
86 (64–97) 58 (52–64) 1.9 (0.7–5.4) 55 (49–60)
Diehr Score
calculated by
researcher
0 67 (43–85) 67 (61–73) 3.7 (1.8–7.5) 65 (59–70)
Heckerling
Score
calculated by
researcher
<2 71 (48–89) 67 (61–73) 3.3 (1.5–6.8) 65 (59–70)
Gennis Rule
calculated by
researcher
No variable
present
62 (39–82) 76 (70–81) 3.8 (1.9–7.2) 74 (68–78)
Singal Score
calculated by
researcher
Probability
<0.26
76 (53–92) 55 (49–61) 3.3 (1.4–7.4) 53 (47–58)
Crowe et al,
2010 [33]
ED Medical record
review of imaging
tests, observation
and readmission
7% (73/
1065)
Clinical
judgment alone
No CT scan 95 (87–98) 86 (84–88) 0.5 (0.2–1.2) 81 (78–83)
CHALICE
criteria
calculated by
researcher
No criteria
present
89 (80–95) 57 (54–60) 1.4 (0.7–2.7) 54 (51–57)
(Continued)
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Streptococcal throat infection
There were 3 studies of streptococcal throat infection.
In 2 comparisons [23, 24] between the Centor Score (Modified and Original score combined
with Tomkins Management Rule) and 1 comparison between the Walsh score and clinical
judgment [23] the proportion of diagnoses missed and the proportion of all participants
Table 4. (Continued)
Study Setting Method of
establishing
disease status
Prevalence
(n/N)
Comparison
(method of
estimating
probability,
making
diagnosis or
management
decision)
Threshold
(low risk if)
Sensitivity
(95%CI)
Speciﬁcity
(95% CI)
% missed
cases of
disease
among
those
classiﬁed
as not
having
disease
(95% CI)
%
classiﬁed
as not
having
disease
(95% CI)
Vaillancourt
et al, 2009
[34]
ES Radiographic
imaging and
telephone or mail
F/U at 14 days
1% (12/
1974)
Clinical
judgment
+ access to
results of
Canadian
C-Spine Rule
Negative 100 (73–
100)
38 (36–40) 0.0 (0.0–0.5) 38 (35–40)
Canadian
C-Spine Rule
score calculated
by researcher
Negative 100 (73–
100)
43 (40–45) 0.0 (0.0–0.6) 43 (40–45)
El Solh et al,
1999 [35]
IP Culture of
respiratory
specimens
9% (11/119) Clinical
judgment
+ structured
data collection
No active TB 64 (31–89) 79 (70–86) 4.5 (1.8–
11.0)
75 (66–82)
El Sohl rule
calculated by
researcher
Negative 100 (71–
100)
69 (60–78) 0.0 (0.0–4.9) 63 (54–71)
Bojang et al,
2000 [36]
OPD Temperature and
parasitemia on
blood ﬁlm
35% (133/
382)
Clinical
judgment alone
No malaria 82 (74–88) 61 (55–67) 13.6 (9.3–
19.5)
46 (41–51)
Olaleye
algorithm
calculated by
researcher
<7 90 (83–94) 63 (57–69) 8.2 (4.9–
13.3)
46 (41–51)
<8 90 (83–95) 78 (72–83) 17.1 (12.8–
22.4)
61 (56–66)
Leibovici
et al, 1991
[37]
IP Blood culture 14% (36/
257)
Clinical
judgment
+ structured
data collection
No
bacteremia
53 (36–70) 84 (79–89) 8.5 (5.4–
13.2)
79 (74–84)
Rule of
Leibovici
calculated by
researcher
<20% 97 (85–
99.5)
60 (53–67) 0.8 (0.1–4.2) 52 (46–58)
Stein et al,
2005 [38]
ED Reverse
transcriptase
PCR assay for
inﬂuenza A and B
21% (53/
258)
Clinical
judgment alone
No inﬂuenza 29 (17–44) 92 (87–95) 18.0 (13.2–
24.1)
87 (82–91)
Cough and
fever rule
calculated by
researcher
Negative 41 (27–57) 92 (87–95) 14.8 (10.4–
20.7)
84 (78–88)
*% missed cases of disease (FN/FN+TN or 1-NPV)
†% classiﬁed as low risk (FN+TN/total N)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0128233.t004
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classified as not having disease was similar. In these studies clinicians would likely have been
aware that all study participants would have pharyngeal swabs taken for testing as per study
protocol. This may lead to an overestimate of the proportion of participants classified as not
having disease by clinical judgment.
Foot and or ankle fracture
From 3 studies of foot and or ankle fracture, there were 3 (100%) comparisons between the Ot-
tawa ankle and foot rules (OAR) and clinical judgment [26–28]. In all 3 comparisons the pro-
portion of diagnoses missed by the CPR and clinical judgment was similar. In 1 of these [27]
the rule classified a larger proportion of study participants as not having disease (fewer false
positives) and in 2 comparisons [26, 28] the CPR classified a larger proportion of participants
as having disease (more false positives). In the 2 comparisons from 2 studies [26, 28] in which
the OAR classified a larger proportion of participants as having disease than clinical judgment,
the clinicians when making a decision or diagnosis, would likely have been aware that all
Fig 3. Results of the included studies.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0128233.g003
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participants would be x-rayed as per study protocol [26] or would have known that an x-ray
could be ordered at their discretion (28). This may lead to an overestimate of the proportion of
study participants classified as not having disease by clinical judgment.
Acute appendicitis
There were 2 studies of acute appendicitis.
In 1 comparison [29] between the Fenyo Score and the combination of score and clinical
judgment, the proportion of diagnoses missed by the score was greater while the proportion
classified as not having disease was similar. In 1 comparison [30] between the Modified Alva-
rado Score and clinical judgment, the proportion of diagnoses missed and the proportion of all
study participants classified as not having disease was similar.
Fig 4. Results of the included studies for conditions with 2 studies.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0128233.g004
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Acute coronary syndrome, pneumonia, head injury in children, cervical
spine injury, active pulmonary tuberculosis, malaria, bacteremia and
influenza.
Of 8 studies (11 comparisons) addressing a variety of conditions, the CPRs showed either an
improvement in the proportion of missed diagnosis or the proportion classified as not having
disease, but this was often offset by a worsening of the other measure.
Discussion
In this review, CPRs were rarely superior to clinical judgment and there was generally a trade-
off between the proportion of study participants classified as not having disease and among
those classified as not having disease, the proportion of missed diagnoses of disease. CPRs for
the diagnosis of DVT generally classified a larger proportion of all participants as not having
disease than clinical judgment, but this was often at the expense of missed diagnoses. In other
disease areas, CPRs showed either an improvement in the proportion classified as not having
disease or the proportion of missed diagnoses, but often with the trade-off of worsening the
other measure. These findings, however, are limited by the small number of studies for many
of the conditions, the design features and generally unclear or high risk of bias in many of the
included studies.
Trade-offs in the proportion classified as not having disease and the proportion of missed
diagnosis by CPRs and clinical judgment seen in this review probably represent differences in
the diagnostic threshold for positivity of the two judgment methods. For example, CPRs might
be developed to avoid missing people with disease and as such the threshold for positivity is set
very low. The CPR would therefore likely be safer than clinical judgment where the threshold
for positivity is implicitly set and variable between and within clinicians, but this is often at the
expense of classifying fewer participants as not having disease (and thereby avoiding further
testing or treatment). Whether clinical judgment or a CPR is the preferred judgment methods
for a particular clinical condition will therefore depend on the relative benefits and harms aris-
ing from true positive and false positive diagnosis.
Variability in the proportion classified as not having disease and proportion of missed diag-
noses of CPRs compared with clinical judgment, even amongst studies of the same CPR, may
be explained in part by features of the clinical setting of the studies. Differences in study design
and methodology, including the type of CPR tested (logistic regression model or other statisti-
cal technique), the rigour with which it was developed, the case-mix of the study population,
‘modifications’ to clinical judgment (with or without structured data collection), by whom
(novice or experienced clinicians) or the way in which the result of the CPR is derived (calcula-
tion by clinician or researcher) may also explain the variation in performance seen in the stud-
ies included in this review. In many studies, clinicians collected diagnostic data on a structured
data collection form. This systematic collection of diagnostic information may improve the ob-
served diagnostic accuracy of the clinicians [39]. Clinician experience has also been shown to
improve the accuracy of diagnosis [40].
Variability in the outcomes of clinical judgment and CPRs within conditions may also be
explained by the method used to elicit clinical judgment, as the method used will likely be asso-
ciated with the implicit threshold for positivity. In studies of appendicitis for example, clinical
judgment was a clinician’s diagnosis of appendicitis or the clinician’s actual action to perform
surgery or not. In studies of ankle fracture, clinical judgment was either a clinicians diagnosis
of fracture or their intention to x-ray a patient, and for studies of sore throat, clinical judgment
may have been a clinicians actual action to prescribe antibiotics or not or a clinicians statement
of their intention to treat with antibiotics. The clinicians threshold for positivity will likely be
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higher for instance, if asked to provide a diagnosis (diagnostic threshold) than when asked of
their intention to do further definitive testing (testing threshold). Where clinical judgment was
elicited by obtaining a clinicians probability estimate on a continuous scale, there was also vari-
ation in the thresholds applied by study researchers. For studies of pulmonary embolism for ex-
ample, thresholds were applied at probabilities of 15 or 20%.
The design of the studies included in this review allows comparison of the performance of
CPRs and clinical judgment when applied independently. In practice, however CPRs are likely
to be used as tools to support or complement clinical judgment. When used in this manner, the
performance of the diagnostic CPRs may vary from that shown in this review. The effect of a
CPR when used in conjunction with clinical judgment can only be fully tested in a study design
in which participants are assigned (ideally randomly) to apply or receive clinical judgment
alone or clinical judgment with access to a CPR. However, studies of diagnostic accuracy or in-
cremental value [41, 42] provide a useful and less costly interim step in the evaluation of CPRs
prior to a randomised controlled trial and can guide future research.
Our study shows that, in the context of medical diagnosis, CPRs do not consistently classify
more individuals as not having disease or miss fewer diagnoses among those classified as not
having disease than clinical judgment. This is in contrast to several reviews comparing clinical
and statistical methods of prediction, often combining studies from fields as diverse as educa-
tion, criminology and healthcare, which have generally found statistical methods to be superior
[3–5]. A more recent body of research however has found that when formally tested, heuristics,
proposed as models of human judgment are, in some situations as accurate as, or more accu-
rate than statistical models [6]. A review comparing the diagnostic accuracy of doctors and sta-
tistical tools for acute appendicitis [43] found that statistical tools had greater specificity than
clinicians. However, most of the studies included in this review were excluded from the present
review because a) the statistical tools and clinical judgment were not applied at the same time
point or b) the statistical tools and clinical judgment were not applied to the same participants.
Due to variation in the design and purpose of the included studies, we did not attempt
meta-analysis across or within study conditions. Instead, we compare CPRs and clinical judg-
ment using two measures 1) the proportion of all study participants classified as not having dis-
ease (a measure or efficiency) and 2) the proportion of participants among those classified as
not having disease, who actually have the disease (false negative rate, a measure of safety). Be-
cause many CPRs seek to either improve diagnosis or identify a group of patients who do not
require additional testing, we believe these are the most clinically relevant measures. Though
these measures are dependent on the prevalence of the disease in the study population, the
studies were judged to have been undertaken in relevant clinical settings. Traditional measures
of diagnostic accuracy, such as sensitivity, specificity and area under a receiver operator charac-
teristic curve are often favoured accuracy metrics because they are commonly believed to be
unaffected by disease prevalence, though this has recently been shown not to be the case [44].
The proportion of participants classified as having disease and the proportion with false posi-
tive results can also be obtained from Figs 3 and 4 and the traditional measures of diagnostic
accuracy from Tables 3 and 4.
The majority of included studies were judged to be at high or unclear risk of bias on 2 or
more of the 4 risk of bias domains assessed. Differential verification (the results of clinical judg-
ment or the CPR influence the performance of reference tests) and incorporation bias (the re-
sults of the CPR are used to make the final diagnosis) affected many studies, particularly
studies of DVT and PE. Further, studies commonly did not include all eligible cases in the anal-
ysis and often it was not clear whether researchers applying a CPR retrospectively to a dataset
were blind to the results of the reference standard. The design of studies of ankle fracture and
streptococcal throat infection may also have led to inaccurate estimates of the diagnostic
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accuracy of clinical judgment. In these studies, the clinicians’ diagnosis or decision that x-ray
or antibiotics are necessary may have been influenced by knowledge that all or most study par-
ticipants would undergo confirmatory testing with an x-ray or throat swab. In this review, in
two of the three studies of ankle and or foot fracture, the Ottawa Ankle Rules were considerably
less efficient than clinical judgment that a fracture was present or that an x-ray was necessary.
This finding conflicts with that a multicentre randomised controlled trial in which application
of the rules lead to x-rays for 79% of study participants compared to 99.6% of participants
when the decision was made by emergency department physicians [45].
The database searches to identify studies for the review were conducted up to March 2013
and eligible studies may have been published since this time. Because of the size of the search,
not all titles and abstracts identified in electronic searches were screened by 2 reviewers. How-
ever, a second reviewer screened a subset of titles and did not find any additional studies. The
search terms used may not have located all eligible studies, but manual searches of systematic
reviews of CPRs and comprehensive reference and citation checking minimise this possibility.
As assessment of the risk of bias in the studies deriving the CPRs or the ‘useability’ features of
the CPRs evaluated in this review was not conducted, but updates to this review should seek to
do this. Such information may assist in the interpretation of the results of the review.
While CPRs show promise as a way of improving clinical decision making, to date there
have been limited studies comparing, in the same participants, the accuracy of CPRs and clini-
cal judgment, and those studies often had design issues that raised the potential for bias and
made interpretation of their results difficult. Though detailed guidance on the validation and
evaluation of prediction models and rules is available [46, 47], guidance on issues specific to
studies comparing the diagnostic performance of CPRs and clinical judgment may improve
this situation. To inform of the potential of diagnostic CPRs to improve diagnosis and patient
outcomes when the CPR is used in combination with clinical judgment, particularly in situa-
tions where the clinician has a high degree of uncertainty, an analysis of studies comparing
care provided when clinicians have access to a diagnostic CPR with usual care would be useful.
In Summary
The limited studies included in this review show that none of the CPRs evaluated to date are
clearly superior to clinical judgment across a range of medical conditions. They also show vari-
ation in the comparative performance of clinical judgment and CPRs between studies for the
same condition and between the same CPRs. There is generally a trade off in the proportion
classified as not having disease and missed diagnosis that is most likely due to different thresh-
olds for positivity associated with clinical judgment and CPRs. The current review highlights
some of the methodological issues relating to the conduct of studies comparing CPRs and clini-
cal judgment, with design features of many of the included studies increasing the potential
for bias.
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